US Navy carrier aircraft markings

Escort Carriers (CVE) 

* The initial classification as auxiliary vessel (AV) was cancelled on 15 July 1943 and all ships were upgraded to CVE (Carrier Vessel Escort). Therefore in the following the designation used in practice is used.

Source: Stefan Terzibaschitsch, "Flugzeugträger der U.S. Navy, Geleitflugzeugträger, Verlag Bernard & Graefe, München, ISBN 3-7637-5119-9

Mission, markings:

 

		Atlantic:  CVE-9 "Bogue" was the first American escort carrier (also called "carrier" for short) to hunt German U-boats in the (mid-) Atlantic by February 1943. CVE-21 "Block Island," CVE-1^3 "Core," CVE-1 "Card," and CVE-25 "Croatan" followed until August. The remaining six "Bogue" CVEs were engaged in training and transporting U.S. Army Air Force aircraft to Liverpool and Glasgow and those of the Marines to Guadalcanal. In 1944, individual carriers of the "Casablanca" class followed, with CVE-60 "Guadalcanal" receiving the most publicity by capturing U-505 with its "Enigma" encryption machine intact (U-505 provided valuable information about the diving depth of German submarines, and after decrypting "Enigma" they also knew where to find them. The only loss was CVE-21 "Block Island", on 29 May 1944 off the Canary Islands by a German torpedo. Since each carrier was accompanied only by destroyers, there was no possibility of mistaken identity, simple numbering of its aircraft was enough. For the Atlantic paint scheme "Dark Gull Gray" / "Insignia White" see "Colors US Navy 1941 - 1945".
Schlicht nummerierte Atlantik FM-2

 

see"Milestones of the Pacific War" Strategy, execution, maps, photos		Pazific:  Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was not interested in capturing or skipping South Sea islands to cut off Rabaul from supplies. That was up to General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Southwest Pacific Area. The "Middle Pacific" area assigned to Nimitz stretched from the equator to just short of the Aleutian Islands, and its sheer size made it not only a military challenge but also a logistical one. From San Diego to Pearl Harbor, about 4,200 km (2,270 nautical miles), from there to the easternmost Japanese position, the Gilbert Islands, about 3,900 km (2,100 nm), to Tokyo again about 5,100 km (2,200 nm). To get across the central Pacific to the Philippines (and from there northward to Japan together with the U.S. Army) as ordered, he needed intermediate bases to shorten the journey to the next target. Atolls, more or less circular clusters of islands in whose 30-50 km (16-27 nm) diameter lagoon the fleet could safely anchor and be supplied, were best suited for this purpose. From an airfield captured or to be created from one of the islets, not only could one's own position be secured, but also the next operation could be prepared. After "Majuro", "Kwajalein" and "Eniwetok" in the Marshall Islands at the beginning of 1944, "Ulithi" atoll in the Caroline Islands followed in October. Abandoning the previous ones, it formed the central base of operations for the major undertakings that followed in the fall of 1944 and 1945, capture of the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Escort carriers were indispensable in these operations. Not only did they provide training for junior personnel, protect supply convoys from attack underwater and from the air, transport replacement aircraft and pilots, sometimes also cover fleet carriers when their aircraft were in action, and, above all, were a fixed, scheduled factor in the landing of troops and their subsequent support. Unlike in the Atlantic, they always sailed in groups, accompanied by destroyers.   Highlight: October 25, 1944, battle off the Philippine island of Samar. Three groups of escort carriers of six each lie in protection of the invasion fleet anchored there, while fleet carriers farther north attempt to sink the last four Japanese aircraft carriers. "Taffy 3" (Escort Carrier Task Unit 77.4.3) with the carriers CVE-63, 66, 68, 70, 71, 73, located farthest north, suddenly finds itself facing a Japanese battle fleet (including the "Yamato") that opens fire on CVE-73 Gambier Bay and CVE-66 White Plains. Since escape is ruled out because of the enemy's higher speed, the only option is to counterattack. One launches what one can immediately get in the air, regardless of the respective loading condition, the seven escort destroyers try to get into attack position. - The result of the tireless and determined effort: Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita gives the order to turn back. A success that no one would have previously associated with escort carriers. However, CVE-73 and the destroyers DD-533 "Hoel" and DD-413 "Samuel B. Roberts" had been sunk (see "Battle off Samar". But there was no time to recover. "Taffy 3" became the target of the first kamikaze attack (CVE-63 "St. Lo" sunk, all others damaged). See the true story of the kamikazes. A new chapter that was to claim many victims on both sides.

* Markings:  In the late 1930s, the extensive markings left no questions unanswered (see "Markings 1936 to 1941"). When, on December 30, 1940, paint in "Light Gray" (FS 36440, ANA 602) was ordered for all first-line aircraft, the colors on the vertical stabilizer, which identified the carrier to which the aircraft belonged, disappeared along with them. All colorful squadron and merit badges also had to be omitted. In the spring of 1942 - the USA was now at war - the squadron number was also omitted (the enemy was not to know which squadron or carrier he was dealing with), followed by the now irrelevant letter, which indicated the purpose of the squadron. This left only the individual number.   From 30/12/1940 to 02/06/1945 there was no marking identifying the aircraft carrier.   As the number of escort carriers increased and the usual grouping of four to six carriers into a carrier division became more common, a mere number made it more difficult to link up with one's own formation when collecting after the attack. A number 3 occurred more often. Also, problems could arise during landing if the number three asked permission to land twice. A marking that clearly identified the unit was urgently needed. Which was not officially allowed. But after the Navy had not intervened when fleet carriers, which had had the same problem, had attached simple geometric signs ("G symbols") to the vertical stabilizer, the first squadrons of escort carriers soon dared to use such decorations too. For some a letter was enough, for others a white bar or whatever was considered practical. Later, more imaginative ones fololowed. Marking by time   Markings on CVE's A - M   Markings on CVE's N - W No formation markings were required when the carrier was sailing alone in the Atlantic (accompanied by destroyers, of course), nor as a training carrier or aircraft transporter. This left only escort for resupply transports and preparation and support of landing operations, and there it depended on the squadron deployed whether it considered a formation marker necessary. All of these missions lasted only a few weeks at a time; more than 2 months was rare. Characteristic of escort carriers was their constantly changing mission. Example CVE-71 "Kitkun Bay": Jan. to Mar. 1944 aircraft transport; May 1944: training cruises; Jun. 1944: deployment off Tinian and Saipan; Aug. 1944: Guam; Sep. 1944: Palau Islands; Oct. 1944: Leyte, Samar (damaged by kamikaze on Oct. 25); Jan. 1945: aircraft transport (damaged by kamikaze on 8. Jan.); Feb. 1945: shipyard, repair; Jun. 1945: support of fleet carriers off Japan; Aug. 1945: Adak, Alaska; Oct. 1945: part of "Magic Carpet" operation, repatriation of soldiers and prisoners of war. *Squadron, Air Group: A squadron was and is a miniature task force in the Navy. Nominal strength on prewar carriers 18 aircraft (more or less for land-based Sqns), practice-oriented during the war, usually a slight preponderance of fighters over bombers. Formed when needed and disbanded when no longer needed. Their designation begins with a "V" for "heavier than air" (for airships it was "Z"), followed by one or two letters indicating the purpose (on fleet carriers in WW II "F" Fighter, "B" Bomber, "S" Scout, "T" Torpedo), followed by the individual number. On escort carriers, limitation was to one fighter and torpedo bomber each, which would have been possible only with reduced numbers in each case. A "composite squadron", VC, fighter and 'bomber in one squadron, solved the problem. On carriers of the "Bogue" and "Casablanca" classes, VC squadrons were the rule. On carriers of the "Sangamon" class, the same was true in principle, but the VF squadron equipped with about 22 F6F Hellcats was also an "air group" because a VC squadron with mixed types was also on board.

Profiles of actual markings Marking system explained   2 June 1945:  Confidential Technical Letter No. 4CTL-45 issued by ComAirPac on 2 June 1945 replaced the previous squadron markings with a new marking system that was now mandatory for every carrier. It was based on assigning 48 escort carriers into eight "Carrier Divisions" of six carriers each (only four assignments at CarDiv 22). Each CarDiv had one or two white boxes characterizing it, identification of the associated carrier by one or two stripes placed in front of it. This marking was to be carried on the vertical stabilizer or tail and on the top of the right wing and bottom of the left wing (see left for example and links to corresponding pages). However, since the end of the war was not in sight at that time, the number of carriers included those that weren't available yet and - as it would later turn out - others that would be immediately assigned to the reserve or not built at all after the end of the war. It was also remarkable that the already completed carriers of the "Commencement Bay" class were assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps, where they first had to see to get aircraft for them, which led to a mixed composition, partly with previous identification of a Naval Air Station. Since Navy regulations regarding unauthorized markings and markings did not apply there, "nose art" was also seen here. On CVE-107 "CVE-107 "Gilbert Island" even generally, as can be seen on the detailed web page of Adam Lewis. Operationally only CVE-106 "Block Island II", CVE-107 "Gilbert Islands", CVE-109 "Cape Gloucester" and CVE-111 Vella Gulf were used, some others did only training runs (later use in the Korean War 1950-1953 and conversions to helicopter carriers and relay station are are not the subject of this page).

All in all, it took years of research. Above all, captions had to be checked for plausibility in order to correctly assign markings. Color drawings and sketches" that merely attributed the "G symbol" to a carrier were not taken into account.

Losses:   CVE-56 Liscome Bay Nov. 24, 1943, Gilbert Islands   CVE-21 Block Island May 29, 1944, vor den Kanaren, Torpedo   CVE-63 St. Lo Oct. 25, 1944, Samar (Philipp.), Kamikaze           CVE-73 Gambier Bay Oct. 25, 1944, Samar (Philipp.), gun fire   CVE-79 Ommaney Bay Jan. 4, 1944, Philippines, Kamikaze   CVE-95 Bismarck Sea Feb. 21, 1945, Iwo Jima, Kamikaze

Damage was inflicted on 28 ships. Of these, CVE-26 Sangamon and CVE-27 Suwanee three times each, seven others two times each. 13 x Kamikaze, 10 x Typhoons.

Sources:  Photos  US National Archives, US Navy;  Profiles Srecko Bradic, Wilfried Eck; Literature: Stefan Terzibaschitsch, "Flugzeugträger der U.S. Navy, Geleitflugzeugträger, Verlag Bernard & Graefe, München, ISBN 3-7637-5119-9; John M. Elliot, The Official Monogram US Navy & Marine Corps Aircraft Color Guide 1940-1949, ISBN 0 914144-32-4; Geoff Thomas, US Navy Carrier Aircraft Colors, ISBN 1 871187036; William T. Y'Blood, The Little Giants, ISBN I-55750-980-8

Acknowledgements for their help to Walter Koch, Switzerland, and Adam Lewis, USA

Modeling:

Aircraft from escort carriers were only to be found on escort carriers. The only exception: those that could no longer land on 25.10.1944 did so on the just conquered, completely soaked Tacloban airfield on Leyte (frequent break). Paint without signs of aging because of the relatively short period of use. No chipped paint.

Text copyright Wilfried Eck

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